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ABSTRACT 
The failure of small firms to grow into large enterprises has been identified as a 
significant problem for the economy of the UK.  This study examines the constraints 
facing IT firms in the Software and Computing Services sector in particular.  
Research was undertaken in the form of interviews examining firm attributes and 
reported constraints.  No clear patterns emerged linking specific constraints with 
patterns of growth, but the importance of effective management was a common 
theme.  Apparent anomalies in the responses at interview direct attention to the 
important and interesting question of the extent to which the “constraints” on firms’ 
growth are determined by entrepreneurs’ perceptions and interpretations of their 
firms and the environments within which they operate. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
“It is the failure of UK small enterprises to grow into large enterprises that may 
be at the heart of the country’s long-term poor economic performance” 
(Storey, 1994, p159) 
So wrote David Storey in a book based largely on research sponsored by, among 
others, the Department of Trade and Industry and the European Commission. 
The importance of the small business sector in a thriving economy has been a theme 
of economic thinking since the mid 1980s.  To some extent the environment faced by 
start-ups has improved through government policy and structural developments such 
as the emergence of new sources of investment, although the UK lags significantly 
behind the USA in this respect. 
This paper presents the results of a study undertaken before the downturn in the 
technology sector, in 1999, exploring the impact of factors commonly cited as 
constraints on the growth of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)2 in the 
software and services sector3.  It sought to explore the prevalence of such factors and 
the extent to which firms’ attributes might influence their impact on growth.  The 
study consisted of interviews with well-established industry figures and managers of 
SMEs. 
This paper begins with an overview of pertinent theories and the results of earlier 
empirical studies of constraints and attributes influencing firm growth, and a brief 
introduction to the Software and Computer Services (SCS) industry.  The 
construction and conduct of the study itself is then described, followed by a summary 
of the findings.  The results are considered in the light of previous work, and a 
preliminary model is proposed to explain apparent anomalies. 
2 FACTORS INFLUENCING GROWTH 
The factors influencing firm development and success have been studied from a 
range of perspectives, but they could be said to vary primarily in the degree to which 
they have an external or internal focus. 
Management theories of strategy and the firm have traditionally drawn on classical 
economics and regarded the firm as a black box, operating within a market 
environment.  However, through the 1990s there was a growing recognition of the 
processes operating within the firm, again drawing on economics, but influenced by 
the work of writers such as Penrose (1959/1995) and Chandler (1961).  Through the 
1980s and 1990s the importance of the development of the firm and the challenges 
facing organisations at different stages of their lives was increasingly recognised. 
In practice, of course, firms do operate in a market environment and have to respond 
to changes in it, but the way in which they respond will impact upon their chances of 
success.  Work by Hawawini et al (2000) suggested that firm specific factors are 
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important for the most successful and least successful firms in an industry, but that 
industry factors are most significant for others.  The finding is far from conclusive 
since the sample used comprised larger, publicly listed firms and included only 
survivors.  However, it does highlight the need to consider both the firm and its 
environment. 
External factors were prominent in the work of Michael Porter who’s model of the 
elements of industry structure (Porter, 1980), identifies five key forces which act 
upon firms within an industry and is typical of industry-level, market-based 
approaches.  Porter (1998) asserts that the first fundamental determinant of a firm’s 
profitability is industry attractiveness.  In the model, the relative strength of the five 
forces determines the ability of firms to earn rates of return on investment in excess 
of the cost of capital.  Hence, as Porter puts it: 
“…despite the best efforts of management.  Industry profitability is not a 
function of what the product looks like or whether it embodies high or low 
technology, but of industry structure.” (Porter, 1998, p. 345). 
Porter acknowledges that firms can influence the five forces and shape an industry’s 
structure, but he argues that the five forces framework should be used to direct the 
creative energies of managers towards the most profitable activity.  He warns though 
that strategy must be formulated with a view to the long-term, recognising that 
changes to industry structure may have undesirable effects in the future.  For Porter 
(1998) the basis of good performance in the long run is “sustainable competitive 
advantage”.  Sustainability of competitive advantage requires barriers to other firms; 
otherwise the firm must offer a “moving target” to its competitors by continuously 
improving its position. 
From this perspective the young firm is more likely to succeed in an emerging 
industry dominated by small firms, though it must build a competitive position which 
can be sustained in the longer term.  This, however, is a significant challenge 
because, as pointed out by Freeman (1995), the evolution of technology, products 
and markets is particularly rapid in technology-based industries where cycles are 
typically very short.  Furthermore, new entrants, new technologies and consolidation 
among industry firms can undermine sources of competitive advantage and can 
change the shape of the industry and its boundaries.  Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
highlighted the problem of defining the relevant boundaries for an industry analysis 
since threats can emerge from outside the recognised industry group, whether 
through substitution products, or horizontal and vertical integration. 
Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1992) argued that the focus of analysis should be on the 
firm: 
It is the firm that matters, not the industry.  Successful businesses ride the waves 
of industry misfortunes; less successful businesses are sunk by them.  (Baden-
Fuller and Stopford, 1992, p13) 
The writers claim that there is little difference in the profitability of industries; that it 
is not industries that mature but the firms in them, and that “profitable” industries are 
so because they are inhabited by imaginative and profitable firms.  Less than 10% of 
differences in the profitability of business units can be attributed to choice of 
industry.  While accepting that industry conditions are influenced by economic 
upswings and downswings, they argue that successful organisations can ride those 
waves. 
Whilst this might appear to contradict the Hawawini (2000) findings reported earlier, 
there is consistency in the finding that the most successful firms rely primarily on 
 3 
their own strengths rather than industry factors and that the poorest performers 
appear to be, to some extent, architects of their own demise. 
In response to perceived shortcomings in strategies placing too much emphasis on 
industry analysis, resource-based views of strategy (e.g. Barney, 1991; Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992) came to prominence in the 1990s in recognition of the importance of 
factors within the firm in building competitive advantage.  In essence, the theories 
propose a relationship between resources, capabilities and competitive advantage as 
shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1 The relationships between resources, capabilities and competitive advantage (Grant, 
1998) 
The Resource Based View (RBV) suggests that profitability comes from exploiting 
the differences in resources and capabilities of individual firms (Grant, 1998).  The 
development of an effective strategy, then, comprises of three elements (Grant, 1998, 
p.111): 
• “Selecting a strategy that exploits a company’s principal resources and 
capabilities 
• “Ensuring that the firm’s resources are fully employed and their profit 
potential is exploited to the limit” 
• “Building the company’s resource base” 
However, in formulating approaches which could be employed by strategists, 
modern theorists have been said to have lost the dynamic aspects of the original 
economic theories (e.g. Pitelis, 2002). 
David Teece (e.g. Teece et al 1994) criticised earlier resource based approaches 
which tended to recommend firms’ accumulating technology assets and protecting 
them aggressively, in an attempt to ensure that their sources of competitive 
advantage are maintained.  Teece pointed out that speed of response and flexibility 
are required along with the ability to co-ordinate and re-deploy resources in response 
to shifting market demands – features of industry recognized by Penrose in her 
original version of resource based theory (Penrose, 1995). 
Dynamic capabilities are said to be a source of competitive advantage in fast-
moving, seemingly chaotic, environments (Schumpeterian environments) and 
 4 
emphasise both changes in that environment and the role of strategic management in 
reconfiguring the skills, resources and functional competencies available to the firm 
to meet the demands of those changes. 
Teece proposed that: 
“...competitive advantage stems from dynamic capabilities rooted in high 
performance routines operating inside the firm, embedded in the firm’s 
processes, and conditioned by its history” (Teece et al, 1994, p.553) 
Such capabilities can only be developed over time, and cannot readily be bought.  On 
the one hand, this implies that diversification may not be an appropriate strategy, but 
on the other, competitive advantage based on dynamic capabilities is very difficult 
for a competitor to replicate. 
For Teece, the key to success is the development of a range of capabilities which 
allow the firm to exploit opportunities and deal with challenges:  
“Identifying new opportunities and organising effectively and efficiently to 
embrace them are generally more fundamental to wealth creation than is 
strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that 
keeps competitors off balance, raises rivals costs, and excludes new entrants.”  
(Teece et al., 1997, p.509). 
The dynamic capabilities approach, then, presents firms as active agents preparing 
themselves for the challenges of the future.  The firm’s success is, therefore, more 
likely to depend upon its own strengths than external factors. 
Modern resource-based approaches address the attributes that a successful firm must 
have, but they have less to say about how the attributes required change over time, 
and how the young firm can grow to be a competent competitor.  This is addressed 
by developmental, or stages of growth models. 
In developmental models and theories the stage of development of the firm is seen as 
an important indicator of the key challenges faced by firms, and determines the key 
focus of management.  The developmental perspective recognises the constant 
change which is a feature of most firms, but especially young ones. 
Churchill and Lewis (1983) proposed a model of firm growth comprising of five 
stages.  During the first stage, “existence”, customers are obtained and the product or 
service is delivered.  During the “survival” stage the business becomes a working 
entity.  This is followed by the “Success” stage during which the decision is made 
whether to expand or to opt for stability and profitability.  The “take-off” stage is 
characterised by rapid growth and financial and managerial challenge.  The final 
stage is “resource maturity” at which point the firm can engage in detailed 
operational and strategic planning. 
Churchill and Lewis (op cit.) identify a number of key success factors: finance, 
personnel, systems, business resources, the owner’s goals, and the owner’s 
operational, managerial and strategic abilities.  The importance of factors of success 
vary from stage to stage, but the writers assert that knowing the business’s stage of 
development can assist owners and managers to better understand the firm’s 
problems and to anticipate future challenges. 
Amar Bhidé (1999), while acknowledging the intuitive appeal of models based on 
stages of growth, challenges their usefulness, given the great variety of ways in 
which firms grow and their ultimate destination.  Bhidé sees firms adopting new 
strategies in response to competitive forces in the industry, at frequencies which vary 
depending upon the sustainability of their sources of competitive advantage, but are 
likely to be much higher for fledgling firms.  For Bhidé: 
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“Any actions entrepreneurs contemplate should be informed by the 
opportunities offered and constraints posed by the overall situation rather 
than by the firm’s ‘stage of growth’” (op cit., p397)  
Bhidé emphasises the development of the firm’s resources to face a range of 
alternative futures and the importance of good strategic planning, implemented 
through strong, visionary leadership. 
Rejection of stages of growth models is understandable if these are interpreted, or 
employed, as universal route maps for firm development.  However, such models do 
remind managers of the changing demands they will face as the firm develops and 
that these are distinctive for young firms.  As Penrose put it: 
 “The differences in the administrative structure of the very small and the very 
large firms are so great that in many ways it is hard to see that the two species 
are of the same genus.  We cannot define a caterpillar and then use the same 
definition for a butterfly” (Penrose, 1995, p.19) 
Managers and researchers alike might benefit from an understanding of the process 
by which this metamorphosis occurs. 
A further criticism levelled at growth stage models is the lack of an underlying 
theory of the processes underlying the changes observed in the nature of the firm as it 
grows.  Garnsey (1998) attempts to address this proposing a systems model which 
draws on the work of Penrose, but focuses attention on the early growth of the firm.  
She describes young firms as going through processes of problem solving which 
often have sequential dimensions.  Solutions generate new problems but in 
overcoming problems, learning occurs in new firms, which provides the basis for an 
expanded repertoire of skills and solutions.  A number of mechanisms operate to 
reinforce growth including the economies of growth identified by Penrose (1995), 
and external pressures from stakeholders.  Growth itself, however, brings with it the 
need for managers to delegate, problems with synchronisation of the firm, and the 
increasing need to manage external relationships. 
While developmental processes are experienced by all firms (since these must 
mobilise resources and establish a resource base to create and capture value), 
whether there are identifiable phases and what form these take varies according to 
the type of activity and business model of the firm.  A phase is a system state, while 
a process is a chain of actions and outcomes.  Processes may occur simultaneously 
but system states cannot.  Where phases occur as identifiable system states, this is 
because developmental processes have taken a form that brings about a sequence of 
states.  Figure 2 illustrates the phases that may result from problem-solving processes 
in young firms that build an in-house production base (Penrose’s starting point).  In 
firms of this kind, sequential phases are often brought about by developmental 
processes. 
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Figure 2 Diverse trajectories of a cohort of firms (Garnsey, 1998, p.548) 
Unless it inherits resources (e.g. through de-merger), the new firm must access and 
mobilise initial resources in order to generate the further resources required for 
growth.  While early phases shown in figure 2 are not uncommon, the form taken by 
further phases shows a great deal of variation.  The recognition of multiple growth 
paths addresses Bhidé’s (1999) criticism of growth stage models, but this approach 
emphasises the changing nature of the challenges facing the entrepreneur and the 
need for new firms to complete foundational processes in order to become self-
sustaining - that is, able to achieve revenues and profits (resource generation).  In 
later models being self sustaining is summarised as the young firm’s ability to create 
and capture value (Garnsey, Stam, Heffernan, 2006). 
Key constraints emphasised by this model are management’s ability to deal with 
knowledge and information, co-ordinate and deploy resources, and to effectively 
assimilate new resources into the organisation.  But the model also highlights the 
significance of path dependence and recognises the impact of chance on the firm’s 
growth and survival. 
In the early stages of the firm’s development the main problems faced relate to 
identification, access to and mobilisation of resources, and establishing the business.  
This could be characterised as a “project” phase, since the activities are mainly non-
recurring and the focus is on the single objective of establishing the firm. 
Later, different problems predominate, such as balancing business processes, 
developing competencies and establishing an industry position.  As the firm grows, 
attention is likely to shift towards dealing with evolutionary change (both within the 
business and in its environment), increasing complexity and human resource issues. 
This presents a pro-active view of developmental approaches, emphasising the need 
to lay the foundations of sustained growth early in the life of the firm, and the need 
to recognise the future impact of decisions. 
To conclude then, firms appear to be influenced by the external environment, but can 
be responsive and proactive rather than passive.  Building a successful firm will 
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require the development of competencies within the firm, based not only its portfolio 
of resources, but the ways in which the resources are configured and leveraged.  
Building internal competence and capabilities may be more important in regimes of 
rapid change. 
Constraints on growth lie not only in external factors, but in the attributes of the firm 
and the competencies of those working in it.  Empirical studies have approached firm 
growth from a number of theoretical perspectives to determine factors which 
promote or impede firms’ advancement.  In the following section empirical studies 
are explored to assemble a list of specific attributes and constraints to be investigated 
in the firm-related interviews. 
2.1 Empirical evidence 
A number of research studies have been undertaken to investigate the problems 
facing small and medium sized firms, many focussing on the high-tech sector.  A 
study by Moore and Segaghat in 1992 examined the constraints to growth of small 
high-technology firms.  Firms reported problems with the recruitment of people with 
the necessary skills and knowledge, funding, though this appeared to ease as firms 
became established, and the availability of suitable premises.  Further work by 
Moore (1994a), based on the ESRC CBR database, identified poor initial 
capitalisation as being associated with poor growth performance.  Moore also found 
that the availability and cost of finance for expansion presented the most significant 
constraint on small high-tech firms, though acknowledging that service firms relied 
less on external funding than manufacturing firms.  Work by Lumme, Kauranen, 
Autio and Kaila in 1993 also looked at small high-technology firms, as part of a 
study comparing British and Finnish firms.  The researchers identified a number of 
challenges faced by growing firms including planning, marketing, technological 
change, research and development, finance, human resources, the availability and use 
of advisors, and internationalisation. 
Birley (1995) studied failed UK firms of all types, interviewing bankers and 
accountants who had been associated with 486 independent owner-managed 
businesses.  She identified the top ten factors which had contributed to failure: 
capital structure; the management Team; the economy; lack of customer diversity; 
poor financial management; owner attitudes; rising costs; lack of planning; pricing; 
suppliers.  Eighty per cent of the failure themes identified related to managerial 
issues, while two thirds of respondents believed that failure would have been avoided 
if remedial action had been taken to address autocratic, inflexible owners, making 
decisions based upon emotion, and ignoring outside help. 
Keeble (1998) examined growth objectives and their relationship with past and future 
performance.  He found that actual growth rates often differ widely from forecasts or 
objectives, but that objectives were heavily influenced by recent performance.  
Larger firms, newer firms and innovating firms were all more likely than others to 
aim for substantial growth.  In the same paper Keeble identifies key constraints as 
shown in Figure 3.  Keeble notes that the most significant constraints are mainly 
external to the firm (availability of finance, increasing competition, market demand 
and availability of overdraft finance). 
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Figure 3 Significant constraints on ability to meet business objectives (Keeble, 1998) 
Cosh and Wood (1998), on the other hand, noted the importance of at least one 
internal factor, finding that larger firms and faster growing firms had strengths in 
process innovation. 
A study by Hughes (1998) examined the growth constraints on Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME).  Two main groups were identified in this longitudinal study: 
stalled growers and sustained growers.  Sustained growers were more likely than 
stalled growers to believe that their competitive advantage lay in a technological 
edge and a range of expertise or products, and were also more likely to have 
dispersed ownership.  They were also more likely to emphasise international markets 
and the importance of management or organisational factors.  Stalled growers were 
more likely to rely on price or cost advantages.  Both sustained and stalled growers 
rated personal attention to client needs, product speciality or quality and reputation as 
their most important competitive strengths. 
Both sustained and stalled growers reported similar patterns of constraints of which 
the most significant were overall market demand, increasing competition, cost and 
availability of finance, management skills, labour skills, marketing and sales skills 
and implementation of technology (Figure 4). 
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Phase 2 Firms: Constraints on Meeting Business Objectives 1994-5 Prospect and Retrospect
Median Scores (0=insignificant 9=highly significant
Number Reporting Scores in Ranges 7-9 shown in brackets
Market Demand
Overall 5.7 (5) 4.9 (4) 6.1 (3) 7 (5)
Overseas 4.4 (2) 3.9 (1) 2.2 (0) 2.9 (1)
Increasing Competition 6.1 (4) 5.2 (3) 4.1 (2) 4.4 (3)
Total rating constraint 7-9 (11) (8) (5) (9)
Finance: Cost and Availability
Expansion 4.2 (4) 4.2 (2) 4 (1) 3 (1)
Overdraft 3.1 (2) 5.3 (5) 4 (1) 3.6 (1)
Total rating constraint 7-9 (6) (7) (2) (2)
Management and Labour
Labour Skills 4.8 (3) 4.3 (3) 2.4 (0) 5.1 (3)
Management Skills 4.1 (1) 5.7 (4) 3 (1) 4.7 (3)
Marketing and Sales Skills 3.8 (1) 4.3 (0) 3.4 (2) 3.7 (2)
Total rating constraint 7-9 (5) (7) (3) (8)
Technology
Acquistion 3.2 (0) 3.3 (0) 2.4 (0) 2.7 (1)
Implementation 3.9 (1) 4.1 (0) 2.4 (0) 2.9 (1)
Total rating constraint 7-9 (1) (7) (0) (0)
Premises or Site 1.0 (0) 2.6 (2) 2 (1) 1.3 (0)
Total rating constraint 7-9 (0) (2) (1) (0)
Total no of all constraints 7-9 (26) (19)
Number of firms 10 10 7 7
Sustained Stalled
Prospect Retrospect Prospect Retrospect
 
Figure 4: Constraints on meeting business objectives 1994-5 prospect and retrospect 
(Hughes, 1998) 
A study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 1998 (endorsed by the Computer Software 
and Services Association – CSSA) found a shortage of quality staff to be the greatest 
constraint faced by technology based firms.  This was followed by availability of 
finance, increased competition, changing market demand, government/macro-
economic issues and the ability of management to cope (Figure 5). 
Barriers to the Growth of Technology Companies
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Shortage of quality staff
Availability of finance
Increased competition
Changing market demand
Government/ macro-economic issues
Ability of management to cope
 
Figure 5 Barriers to the growth of technology companies (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1998) 
The PriceWaterhouseCoopers study also found that the best performers in fast-
growing technology organisations had identified a good niche and focussed tightly 
upon it.  A “good” niche is one which involves a growth market with scope for 
expansion, and with opportunities to move into other areas when it becomes 
necessary. 
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2.1.1 Summary of empirical findings 
From the above discussion a number of factors can be identified which may 
influence a firm’s successful growth (Table 1).  These include the firm’s origin, age, 
size and development path, particularly its recent growth record.  The sources of its 
competitive advantage and its preparedness to innovate and seek out new markets, 
particularly overseas, also have a bearing.  Management and organisational factors 
seem to be highly significant, along with marketing and sales skills.  A large number 
of potential constraints on growth have also been identified.  The most significant 
problems appear to be availability of human resources and finance, poor marketing 
skills, market demand and management skills, particularly among owners.   
Factors influencing growth
•Origin and age 
•Initial capitalisation
•Ownership 
•Development path
•Growth objectives
•Size 
•Management or organisational factors 
•Research and development
•Technological edge
•Range of expertise or products
•Product speciality or quality
•Price
•Cost advantages 
•Reputation 
•Internationalisation
•International markets 
•Personal attention to client needs 
Constraints on firm growth
•Management team skills
•Owner attitudes
•Effectiveness of  planning
•Human resources
•Availability of skilled people
•Availability and use of advisors 
•Technological change
•Poor implementation of technology
•Poor financial management 
•Rising costs
•Capital structure
•Cost and availability of finance
•Cost and availability of overdraft
•Marketing and sales skills
•Overall market demand
•Increasing competition
•Lack of customer diversity
•Suppliers
•Government/macro-economic issues
•Availability of premises or site
 
Table 1 - Summary of Attributes and Constraints 
3 THE SOFTWARE AND COMPUTING SERVICES INDUSTRY 
This study focuses on a favourable period for growth of software firms, around the 
Millennium, in order to identify difficulties that are likely to be present under all 
business cycle conditions.  Before the economic downswing, the Software and 
Computer Services (SCS) industry in the UK was made up of approximately 70,000 
enterprises, with 7,000 new ones created every year, though the majority of these 
were very small, often one-person, firms. 
The SCS industry operated in a fast growing market worth approximately £16.4bn, 
which saw rates of growth increase consistently between 1993 and 1998 (Figure 6).  
Some sectors experienced growth rates in excess of 30%, while growth of UK firm’s 
business overseas was 32%, with the USA featuring strongly.  The UK itself was one 
of the fastest growing markets in Europe. 
 11 
UK Software & Computing Services Industry
Growth in Real Terms
16% 15%
12%
10%
7%
0% 0%
9%
11% 12%
14%
19%
21%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 
Figure 6 UK SCS industry – Growth in real terms (Holway 1999) 
Profitability increased by 25% in 1998 (adjusted for one-off effects), but around 20% 
of companies reported losses.  The ten largest companies were all foreign-owned and 
accounted for £6.4bn of sales.  There were 385 merger and acquisition deals in the 
year to April 1999, involving considerations totalling £3.5bn and foreign acquisitions 
by UK companies exceeded foreign acquisitions of UK companies. 
Of the £16.4bn turnover of the UK market, only £4.7bn (29%) was accounted for by 
applications software products and solutions, and tools, the remainder being services 
ranging from outsourcing to project management and consulting. 
Growth rates varied considerably by size of company, as shown in Figure 7.  Growth 
rates also varied by sector with project services at 31%, outsourcing 24% and 
system/operating software at –3%. 
UK SCS Growth by Size of Company
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Figure 7 UK SCS Growth by Size of Company 
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4 INVESTIGATING ATTRIBUTES AND CONSTRAINTS 
The factors identified in the literature as influencing growth, or acting as constraints 
upon it, were use as a basis for the investigation.  Data collection consisted of 
interviews with experienced industry figures, all of whom had been involved in a 
number of small and medium sized IT firms, and interviews with the managers of 
small and medium-sized companies in the sector.  
The first group of interviews provided an overview, based on the experience of 
people involved in a large number of firms in a variety of executive and non-
executive positions.  These interviewees (Table 2) were expected to give a more 
objective view than those more directly involved with particular firms, and to 
identify factors specific to the SCS industry not necessarily found in the literature. 
 Current Status Experience 
A Director of a Venture Capital Fund 
specialising in technology-based 
enterprises. 
Co-founded more than 20 technology-
based firms 
B Director of an Industry Association Employment in large CSS firms and 3 
IT start-ups 
C Venture Capitalist and Business 
Angel 
Chairman or director of 15 software 
companies 
D Mergers and Acquisitions Director of 
a Software enterprise 
Founded and managed software and 
hardware companies; non-exec 
Chairman of software and electronics 
firms 
E Serial Entrepreneur and Management 
consultant specialising in IT firms 
 
Employment in IT department of large 
engineering firm.  Chairman, 
Managing Director and Director of 
software, hardware and services 
companies. 
F Chartered accountant specialising in 
Corporate Finance.  Involved in 
mergers and acquisitions of SMEs. 
Chairman or Non-exec director of 4 
software companies. 
Table 2 - Overview Interviewees 
The second group of interviews, with managers, were intended to provide exemplar 
company profiles.  The firms included represent small, medium and large 
organisations within the target population, and both software and services providers.  
Selection was based on details held on the Barcroft database, together with 
companies identified in the media and through the Cambridge Network.  They 
provided more in-depth information on the issues faced by specific firms.  The 
results were expected to be somewhat more subjective, but provided a perspective on 
the way in which influences are perceived at the time at which they are faced. 
Managers from six companies were interviewed, selected to reflect a range of 
deliverables and sizes.  Most companies were involved in software services rather 
than software packages, reflecting the shape of the UK software industry (Holway, 
1999): 
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Firm Age Turnover Staff Type 
Company 1 10 years £20m 2504 Software consultancy 
Company 2 5 years £20m 100 Software consultancy 
Company 3 9 years £17m 180 IT & PM consultancy 
Company 4 10 years £2m 31 Bespoke software developer 
Company 5 14 years £2m 45 Software package producer 
Company 6 10 years £5.5m 66 Software consultancy 
Table 3 - Firms Selected for Management Interviews 
4.1 Interviews 
The overview interviews were intended to provide a wide range of ideas and issues 
for further investigation and were, therefore, relatively unstructured, though 
informed by the literature review and discussions with the Barcroft Partnership.  Due 
to the availability of the interviewees, two interviews were conducted by telephone, 
but the remainder were conducted at the interviewees’ premises.  
The management interviews were semi-structured, employing the framework 
presented in Appendix 1.  The questions were derived from the literature and from 
issues raised in the overview interviews.  The interviewees were executive directors 
of the firms in question, with the exception of company 5 where the former 
Managing Director was interviewed.  Three interviews were conducted at the 
companies’ premises, one at the director’s home, one at the Judge Institute and one 
by telephone (company 2). 
The focus of data collection for the company profiles was based on the literature 
described in Section 2 and the results of the overview interviews.  The interviews and 
data search focussed on 4 aspects of the firms and their development (see 
Appendix 1), the rationale for the content of each was as follows: 
Section 1 – Employees, Sales and Profit for the last 5 years; Start up details and type 
of firm. 
Historic data was obtained to establish rate and pattern of growth, identified by a 
number of writers as a significant factor with respect to constraints encountered (e.g. 
Drucker, 1996; Garnsey, 1998; Hughes, 1998).  Variations between industry sub-
sectors have also been widely reported (e.g. Barber et al, 1989), as have the origin of 
the firm, the type of founders and the nature of funding (Barber et al., 1989; Garnsey, 
1998; Hughes 1998). 
Section 2 – Source and experience of management team 
The experience and skills of the management team have been identified as a key 
weakness of many small and medium firms (e.g. Barber et al., 1989; Birley, 1996; 
                                                
4
 Directly employed staff numbered only 30.  Most staff were self-employed on a contract basis. 
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Storey, 1994), while many management teams have also been found to be reluctant 
to seek out and use external advisors (e.g. Birley, 1996). 
Section 3 – Strategy and source of business 
Strategic objectives have been identified as a factor in the growth of the firm, 
although rarely as directly as might be expected (e.g. Hughes, 1998; Keeble, 1998), 
while the ability to change direction in response to environmental pressures has been 
recognised as a key management competence (e.g. Grant, 1998).  The importance of 
a good customer base was identified in the overview interviews as well as by Hughes 
(1998) and Birley (1996), though what represents a “good” size appears to vary 
considerable with the type of business.  Establishment of international trade was also 
deemed important by some interviewees and supported in the literature (e.g. Lumme 
et al, 1993; Hughes, 1998). 
Section 4.1 – Firm’s competitive advantages 
The factors on which a company competes are expected to influence the degree to 
which it experiences constraints on its growth.  Most of the items included in item 
4.1 were taken from the study undertaken by Alan Hughes (1998) at the ESRC 
Centre for Business Research (CBR).  The item on innovation was included in 
response to the work of Keeble (1998).  The overview interviews had not raised any 
other significant features, nor had the earlier literature. 
Section 4.2 – Constraints on growth of firm 
This section also draws on the ESRC CBR, as reported in Hughes (1998) and Keeble 
(1998).  The overview interviews confirmed most of these items, but also identified a 
shortage of management staff, access to customers in general, the strength of large 
competitors and a lack of credibility with customers.  The importance of strategic 
decisions made early in the life of the firm has been identified by a number of 
resource-based strategists (e.g. Teece et al., 1994).  
 
5 INTERVIEW AND SURVEY FINDINGS 
5.1 Overview Interviews 
Those approached were very willing to make the time available for the interview, 
generally about 30 minutes, though some were shorter.  Most interviewees believed 
that the growth of IT firms beyond the start-up/small business stage is an important 
issue and most asked for access to the finished report.  The findings of the interviews 
are summarised below under headings derived from the common themes raised. 
5.1.1 Marketing 
Marketing was deemed to be a great weakness in the UK, particularly when 
compared with the USA.  There is a shortage of experienced staff and a poor 
understanding of the market.  One interviewee noted that too many firms seem to 
think that “marketing is the thing you think about after you have developed the 
product".  It was also pointed out that marketing is too easy to ignore, since the 
impact of cutbacks in this area is not felt until 3-6 months later.  Marketing was 
likened to the tiller of a giant ship – “the response is slow but powerful”. 
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5.1.2 Sector variations 
Most interviewees acknowledged that there are differences between software and 
services firms.  One interviewee described the difference as being “channels versus 
people”.  The key problem with services firms was seen as their resource limited 
nature, which meant that they were unlikely to grow very large, a fact exacerbated by 
cultural differences between national markets and the need to be located at the point 
of delivery.  Services were deemed easier to sell in the sense that “what you see is 
what you get”, but margins are defined and always under pressure. 
Software was said to be easier to sell in the USA that the UK, mainly due to the 
willingness to be early adopters, generally lower prices, and the corporate approach 
to software purchasing.  The market is, however, dominated by a few large players, 
though it was pointed out that there are some “interesting crumbs” to be picked up by 
other firms. 
5.1.3 Funding 
It was generally agreed that the venture capital industry in the UK compared poorly 
with that in the USA.  The situation was improving, but there remained a high level 
of risk-aversion, with almost every fund aiming to invest only in firms certain to 
succeed.  As one interviewee put it “things have got better, but only so that those 
who would have got funding anyway get it quicker”.  The attitude to failure prevalent 
in Silicon Valley, where failure was said to be accepted as part of the investment 
process was, almost universally, seen as the way forward.  However a warning note 
was sounded by one interviewee who wondered whether a smaller economy could 
bear a failure rate as high as that experienced in the USA. 
The amount of work required of the firm seeking funding was also criticised, as was 
the failure to provide funding to early-stage companies, (which reduces the downside 
risk, but also limits the upside potential).  One interviewee pointed out that limited 
funding also acts as a constraint on growth.  The example was quoted of an internet-
related company in the UK whose valuation grew from £200,000 to £26.5m in 21 
months on first round funding of £500,000.  The company’s main competitor, based 
in the USA but otherwise similar, achieved a valuation of $2.4bn in the same period 
but with first round funding of $23m.  It was also felt that UK firms should not 
ignore US venture capital funds. 
One interviewee described the capital structure of the firm as “probably the single 
most influential thing in the development of the business”.  An example of poor 
structure was quoted describing one firm whose founders were keen to avoid venture 
capital, preferring instead to seek funding from “Business Angels”.  The firm 
repeatedly sought additional funding, involving more and more investors as time 
went on.  By the time the firm was acquired by a large American company it had 66 
individual investors, with widely divergent views on its future strategy. 
The involvement of external funders was generally deemed to be helpful, but this 
depended upon the particular circumstances of the firm, and the approach of the 
funders to it.  A good fit between the two seemed to be the most important 
requirement.  Ultimately, it was felt that independence was likely to be growth-
limiting. 
Inadequate initial funding was perceived to be a significant problem for any firm but 
even more so for firms which achieve rapid growth, since they may underestimate 
the high cash burn-rate required to sustain it. 
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5.1.4 Management 
Management was identified as a key issue by all interviewees.  There is a need for a 
broad skill base in the management team, though many founders are reluctant to 
recruit good people, fearing a loss of control.  The founders themselves are often 
technically competent but not well suited to the management of a growing firm, and 
rarely prepared to accept the fact, or to accept advice. 
There was deemed to be a lack of management talent in the industry generally, but at 
least one interviewee believed that the key requirement was for one “triple-A guy” 
around whom a team could be built. 
Financial management and “commercial awareness” were specific areas of weakness 
highlighted, along with an understanding of business and particularly the need to 
manage cash flow as well as sales. 
5.1.5 Credibility 
Credibility was identified as an issue for small firms, though it was suggested that 
large firms were sometimes attracted to small firms due to their particular strengths 
of quick reaction, responsiveness and willingness to create new solutions rather than 
reproduce standard models.  In addition, small firms were expected to remain loyal, 
and larger firms preferred to be in a powerful position over suppliers.  However, the 
issue of liquidity remained a concern.  One interviewee recalled a manager from a 
large firm saying “we like doing business with you but we wish you were larger so 
that we didn’t worry whether you would fold tomorrow”.  
Although interviewees believed that relationships with large companies could be 
beneficial, they felt that small companies must beware of becoming too dependent on 
a single customer and must not expect to be supported by a customer when times are 
hard. 
It was also suggested that credibility can be improved through the introduction of 
well-respected board members, a venture capital investor, or through marketing – 
either by traditional means or by means of the Internet (which can be particularly 
powerful as a first impression). 
Overall, the credibility issue was regarded more as a challenge than a constraint. 
5.1.6 Survival 
It was pointed out that sustained growth relies on survival through difficult market 
conditions and other “bad times”.  Momentum and size were identified as vitally 
important, as repeat business was likely to be the key to survival, but there was also a 
view that, particularly in crowded markets, consolidation meant that firms must 
“acquire or be acquired”.  Although many small firms develop initially in niches, 
there was a view that a focus on a niche almost inevitably meant ultimately selling-
out to a larger enterprise. 
5.1.7 Planning 
The importance of effective planning was identified by a number of interviewees.  
Expressed by one as “know where you want to be in 2 or 3 years and how you are 
going to get there”.  This did not imply rigid adherence to outdated programmes, but 
required regular, almost constant attention to the actions necessary to achieve the 
firm’s objectives.  One interviewee felt that many problems could be overcome if 
managers were only prepared to “sit and think”. 
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Exit strategies were deemed to be poor or non-existent in most firms, although it was 
pointed out that an Initial Public Offering (IPO), a merger or acquisition does not 
mark the end of the firm’s development, but should be the beginning. 
The future opportunities available to a firm were believed by some to be very closely 
linked to its past, although there are opportunities to change direction quite 
dramatically if the situation demands it.  One interviewee stressed the importance of 
ensuring that, ultimately, all decisions improve the value of the company (and this is 
not measured purely in terms of market capitalisation). 
5.1.8 Internationalisation 
Internationalisation was regarded as important by most interviewees.  There was 
deemed to be a need to operate at a European level, and increasingly globally, though 
the significance of this varied from firm to firm and was seen as more important for 
software package producers than for services firms.  The main motive was not 
necessarily to access a larger market per se, but to be in a position to compete with 
competitors who are operating on a global scale. 
5.1.9 Other issues 
A number of interviewees highlighted the lack of effective networking in the UK, 
leading to poor interaction between industry players.  Such interaction has been 
identified as a key feature of the Silicon Valley culture in the USA. 
Although one interviewee identified a shortage of good advisors as an industry 
problem, another believed that advice was readily available but that firms are 
reluctant to pay professional advisors when free advice was at least as good. 
Flexibility in property leases was also identified as a significant problem for some 
firms, although this tends to be much less severe for services companies than for 
those involved in production or distribution.  
5.2 Firm-related Interviews 
5.2.1 Company 1 
Company 1 was a software consultancy providing complete managed solutions to 
blue chip customers for all IT requirements.  Large-scale software development and 
support was tailored to specific customer needs, with on-site expertise ranging from 
individual consultants to whole teams of developers, analysts and managers.  The 
company was founded in May 1989 and had grown to an annual turnover of £20m.  
The customer base was approximately 20, with 5% of sales being outside the UK. 
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 1995 1996 1997 1998 est 19995 
Employees 3 3 9 16 30 
Sales £000s 1,919 3,694 7,801 15,800 20,300 
Net Profits £000s -54 325 820 2,600 3,000 
Founded 1989     
5.2.2 Company 2 
Company 2 was a software consultancy focussing on SAP implementation, though 
increasingly broadening their service to integration with other, related, products and 
services, such as e-commerce.  The service extended into the provision of support 
and development of systems once installed.  The company operated generally at the 
high-end of the market, with 30% of their business outside the UK, though almost all 
with UK clients.  The company floated on the London main market in March 1999 
valued at £85.4m, though market activity increased this to £120m almost 
immediately. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 19996 
Employees 3 13 43 102 200 
Sales £000s 1,445 7,161 10,353 20,024  
Net Profits £000s 32 1 10 1,224  
Founded Oct 1994     
5.2.3 Company 3 
Company 3 was an IT and Project Management consultancy operating in a wide 
variety of business sectors, including finance, utilities, public sector, defence, 
transport and retail.  Services offered include strategy and business analysis, project 
management and support, and software and systems process improvements.  Though 
they served a large number of clients, most were Blue-chip or public organisations.  
Only 5% of the business was outside the UK. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Employees 60 80 115 140 180 
Sales £000s 3,200 5,270 7,250 12,600 16,500 
Net Profits £000s 45 176 45   
Founded 1990     
5.2.4 Company 4 
Company 4 was a bespoke software developer providing consultancy, development, 
training and support for client/server, web and CD applications.  The company was 
                                                
5
 1999 figures are the interviewee’s estimates 
6
 Public Limited Company – Results for Financial Year ending 1999 not yet published 
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based in London, with an office in Germany.  The company was founded in 1989 and 
was acquired by a larger enterprise in 1999, though all staff and managers were 
retained.  It served around 20 customers, with very little business outside the UK. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 19997 
Employees   28 31  
Sales £000s 1,108 1,354 1,432 1,584  
Net Profits £000s 22 53 33 21  
Founded 1989     
5.2.5 Company 5 
Company 5 was a software producer specialising in the financial sector.  Founded in 
1985, it was acquired by a larger enterprise in 1998.  The company was founded by 
the then Chairman and had a turnover of around £2m at acquisition.  The customer 
base was approximately 70, with around 35 active, and 50% of sales were outside the 
UK, mainly in Europe. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 19998 
Employees 48 58 51 45  
Sales £000s 1,793 1,817 2,069 1,785  
Net Profits £000s9 
     
Founded 1985     
5.2.6 Company 6 
Company 6 was an Internet software consultancy helping blue-chip corporate clients 
to develop and realise e-business strategies, from offices in the UK, USA and India.  
The company was founded in 1985, originally as a software product company, but in 
1988 the focus shifted to software services.  The estimated turnover for 1999 was 
£10m, and the customer base was approximately 40, with around 33% of sales being 
outside the UK, mainly in the USA. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 Est. 1999 
Employees 29 44 51 66 120 
Sales £000s 1,700 2,047 3,142 5,357 10,000 
Net Profits £000s 203 177 73 379  
Founded 1985     
                                                
7
 Company 4 was acquired in 1999 
8
 Company 5 was acquired in 1998 
9
 Profit data not disclosed 
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5.2.7 Growth paths 
The growth paths of the companies in terms of annual sales are shown in Figure 8.  
Annual sales figures for years prior to 1995 are based on extrapolation from the 
foundation date.  The rate of growth experienced by companies 1, 2, 3 and 6 since 
1995 is remarkable, given that all but company 2 were founded some time earlier 
(company 6 can be considered to have been founded in its present form in 1988).  
The growth of company 2 is even more dramatic, but its particular sector had been 
one of considerable growth (SAP). 
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Figure 8 Annual sales since start-up for interviewed firms 
Presented with 1995 as base 1 (Figure 9), 3 clear groups emerge, companies 1 and 2, 
large and growing rapidly, companies 3 and 6 not far behind them (with company 6 
accelerating), and companies 4 and 5 with flat or slightly declining sales. 
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Figure 9 Annual sales on 1995 base for interviewed firms 
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Figure 10 shows the growth of the firms in terms of employment.  No information 
was available for company 4, but it is understood that there was relatively little 
variation over the 5-year period.  The figures for company 1 are misleading since 
these relate to permanent staff only.  By 1999 company 1 was employing around 220 
additional staff on a contract basis.  As would be expected for services companies, 
growth of employment has broadly followed growth of turnover. 
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Figure 10 Annual employment for interviewed firms10 
5.2.8 Summary of findings  
The findings of the individual company interviews are summarised in Table 4 
                                                
10
 No historic employment data was available for company 4 
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Table 4 Company interview summary – attributes and constraints11 
5.2.8.1 Attributes 
All of the firm-related interviewees12 regarded an established reputation as an 
important attribute.  Even the small firms had established a reputation within the 
niche that they served and believed that this was important both in generating repeat 
business and obtaining new customers.  It is worth noting that company 5’s good 
                                                
11
 Reputation appears as both an attribute and a constraint.  Established reputation was deemed by all 
to be an attribute of their firms.  However, Company 5 had suffered with some customers as a result of 
failure to meet promises, and this had become a constraint on the firm’s growth. 
12
 In the following discussion firm-related interviewees are referred to as managers 1-6, corresponding 
to the firm with which they are associated 
Interview Summary - Attributes and Constraints 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Turnover (£) 20m 20m 16m 1.7m 2m 6m 
Rate of growth of annual sales (last 2 years) 66% 69% 52% 8% 0% 79% 
International business 5% 30% 5% 0% 50% 33% 
Marketing/promotional skills   
Speed of service      
Established reputation       
Cost Advantages  
Flair and creativity   
Contract Innovation   
Personal attention/responsiveness to customers     
Flexibility     
Process     
Quality of Staff     
Price    
Product or service design    
Product or service innovation   
Product or service quality    
Specialised expertise/product/services     
Range of expertise/product/services  
Recognising needs of market  
Experience  
Constraints 
Availability and cost of finance for expansion 
Shortage of skilled labour      
Shortage of experienced management staff 
Management effectiveness   
Marketing and sales effectiveness  
Difficulties in acquisition of technology 
Difficulties in implementing new technology 
Availability of premises or site   
Availability of knowledgeable professional advisors 
Access to customers   
Access to overseas markets 
Overall growth of market demand  
Increasing competition   
Strength of large competitors 
Lack of credibility with customers     
Strategic decisions made early in the firm’s life   
Reluctance to Recruit  
Founder  
Poor Reputation  
Company Attributes 
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reputation was based on its early years of operation when its focus was firmly on a 
particular group of customers. 
Speed of service was also widely regarded as important by all but manager 5.  
Although only managers 3 and 4 identified this explicitly, managers 1, 2 and 6 
identified Rapid Application Development (RAD) as highly significant and this has 
been taken to be equivalent. 
Four managers (1, 2, 4 and 5) believed that flexibility was important, but in the case 
of company 5, excessive flexibility created its own problems, with some sales 
requiring extensive customisation of the software package. 
Development and management of processes was a key feature of all of the fast-
growing firms (companies 1, 2, 3 and 6), and a particular weakness of company 5.  
Company 4 was one of the first in its sector to achieve ISO 9000 accreditation, but 
the value of this, other than to qualify for some tenders, was deemed to be limited.  
The two largest firms also focussed on contract innovation, offering fixed price 
contracts and risk-sharing arrangements.  All but the managers from the two largest 
firms identified specialised expertise as strengths. 
Marketing and promotional skills were identified by only two managers (5 and 6), 
although manager 1 believed that this was something that would have to be 
developed soon.  Price was identified as an important feature for 3 firms (1, 3 and 4), 
although in the case of company 4 this was seen as a pre-requisite for small firms 
rather than a selling point. 
The quality of staff was raised by four managers (1, 2, 4 and 6) as important, with all 
of these firms investing in development and training, despite the fact that the vast 
majority of company 1’s staff were employed on a contract basis.  Company 3 also 
employed large numbers of contract staff, but it relied on individuals to deal with 
their own training and development needs in most cases.  Manager 4 believed that 
the competencies of the firm were those of its staff, with very little more derived 
from “corporate learning”. 
5.2.8.2 Constraints 
The shortage of good quality labour was identified by all managers but one (manager 
5), although the extent to which it had actually slowed growth was unclear.  In the 
case of company 5, the problem had not occurred due to the firm’s reluctance to 
recruit from outside, even when skills it required could easily be acquired.  Manager 
4 reported problems in retaining staff, particularly those who had joined as graduates, 
due to the limited development opportunities available in a small firm. 
Four managers recognised the problems of credibility with large customers.  For the 
largest firms (companies 1 and 2), this was felt to be largely a thing of the past, 
particularly for company 2 where a distinct improvement had been noted since its 
Initial Public Offering (IPO).  For company 5, the problem had increased in recent 
times due to its poor delivery performance and was not therefore directly linked to its 
size or stage of development.  Manager 6 reported that the problem of credibility was 
much greater in the UK than in the USA.  A related problem reported by manager 6 
was the difficulty in identifying and gaining access to decision makers. 
Management effectiveness was identified only by the managers of the two smallest 
firms.  In the case of company 4 this was due to a reduction in the enthusiasm and 
flexibility of the founders who were not always willing to challenge accepted 
practice.  In the case of company 5, it was suggested that the most significant 
problem was the founder’s reluctance to cede control of the firm to the management 
 24 
team and his unwillingness to accept advice, though, as mentioned elsewhere, this 
was the personal view of an interviewee who had already left the firm. 
Marketing and sales effectiveness was identified as a constraint only by manager 3; 
though manager 1 noted that without development in this area it could become a 
problem. 
Only two managers recognised decisions made early in the firm’s life as a source of 
current constraints.  Manager 1 believed that as a software services firm, the 
company’s growth was constrained by its reliance on new resources.  It was felt that 
software products should be developed alongside the present business in order to 
provide more scope for expansion.  Company 6’s problems were said to relate to the 
premises originally selected by the firm which were rapidly outgrown, leading to the 
firm being split across a number of sites.  This appeared to be more of an operational 
problem than a growth constraint per se. 
5.2.8.3 Correlation between features and constraints 
There appear to be few areas of correlation between the attributes of the firms and 
the constraints encountered by them, but the following items were noted: 
• The development of management systems and processes was a feature of all four 
fast-growing firms. 
• The two smallest (and slowest growing) firms both reported problems with 
management effectiveness. 
• The two smallest (and slowest growing) firms have both been acquired by larger 
concerns. 
• Problems with credibility due to size were reported by fast growing firms, but not 
the slow or stalled firms. 
• The largest firms are among the fastest growing. 
5.3 Summary 
5.3.1 Comparison between overview and firm interviews 
There are a number of differences between the issues raised in the overview 
interviews and those with the managers of individual companies. 
The problem of poor marketing skills was deemed highly significant by the first set 
of interviewees, but only manager 3 regarded this as a constraint, although manager 1 
recognised the need to improve its marketing skills to maintain growth. 
Variations between the software and services sectors noted in the overview 
interviews were acknowledged by manager 1 who recognised the potential limits to 
growth in the services sector and the attractions of software packages.  It is worth 
noting that the division between software and services is not very clear.  Company 5 
was ostensibly a software package business, but it was heavily involved in 
customising the product for individual customers, while company 6, which was 
primarily a services company, had built up a development capability. 
Although a number of managers made reference to the poor state of UK venture 
capital, none identified funding problems as a constraint, although a number reported 
the need to match growth to revenue generation.  This finding appears to be at odds 
with the findings of the overview interviews. 
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Most managers acknowledge the importance of good management in developing the 
firm, and the two slowest-growing firms both reported problems with management 
effectiveness.  Furthermore, the problems evident in firm 5 with respect to the 
activities of the founder were as predicted.  The presence of at least one “Triple-A 
guy”, a particularly capable person, does appear to be borne out in companies 1, 2, 3 
and 6, with strong individuals with good management skills, leading all four firms. 
Credibility was recognised as an issue by a number of managers, but it appeared to 
have been overcome in most cases.  Company 4 had suffered badly from reliance on 
a single large customer which represented 70% of its workload at the time when all 
work was withdrawn due to a global policy.  Although company 4 survived, and 
maintained profitability, it failed to reach previous levels of turnover.  These findings 
are consistent with those of the overview interviews 
Other than manager 4, none of the managers reported crises or particularly bad 
trading periods in their firms’ histories.  However, there was evidence that most 
firms had responded to the market by shifting the emphasis of their business, if not 
the actual strategy.  This was most obvious in the move towards e-commerce 
reported by all firms other than company 5.  Hence successful firms did appear to be 
moving beyond their initial niche, a strategy consistent with the findings of the 
overview interviews (and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1998). 
The importance of planning emphasised in the overview interviews appears to be 
echoed in the individual firm interviews.  The two largest companies both planned 
with 2-3 year horizons and monitored and reviewed the plans regularly.  Company 6 
also had a well-developed planning process, which, although introduced at the behest 
of non-exec directors, appeared to have been adopted wholeheartedly.  Companies 3, 
4 and 5 did not have formal planning processes, and also had lower rates of growth 
than the other 3 enterprises. 
The concerns about an acute shortage of good staff expressed in the overview 
interviews were echoed by 5 of the 6 managers, while manager 6 also expressed 
concern about the high salaries demanded by junior staff. 
Despite the importance attached to internationalisation by the overview interviewees 
the managers seemed almost casual in their approach to overseas markets.  Four were 
active in foreign markets, with most in the USA, only company 5 had significant 
sales in mainland Europe. 
The managers reported no particular problems with access to foreign markets, though 
company 4 had had difficulty in Germany, and most agreed that the USA is less 
difficult than Europe.  The attitude of customers in the USA was noted by managers 
6, echoing similar comments from the overview interviewees. 
Networking was not identified as a problem for any of the firms despite being raised 
as a significant issue in the overview interviews.  The use of external advisors 
appeared to be limited to non-executive directors but no shortage was reported. 
The problems of property and leases were raised by only two of the managers 
interviewed. 
The most significant constraint reported by managers was a shortage of good quality 
labour.  The overview interviews additionally identified the venture capital system in 
the UK, poor management, poor marketing and bad planning. 
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6 REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The six firms considered in this study vary considerably in size, age, development 
path and growth rate.  Four firms (companies 1, 2, 3 and 6) had achieved annual sales 
growth rates in excess of 50%, while the other two (companies 4 and 5) were more or 
less stalled.  These groupings will be used through most of the following analysis. 
6.1 Attributes 
The citing of reputation by all the managers as a significant attribute reflects the fact 
that all of the firms were focussed on particular market sectors or niches.  The two 
small firms served smaller groups of customers than the larger four and were able to 
survive even quite difficult market conditions through repeat business and 
recommendations13.  The importance of reputation is consistent with the findings of 
the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1998) study with respect to market focus.  The four 
fast growing firms were all focussed on fast growing sectors involving Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) or e-commerce and had found it possible to move with the 
market into new sub-sectors 
Speed of service was also reported as an attribute of all but one firm.  Hughes (1998) 
also reports this as an area of perceived competitive advantage for both stalled and 
sustained growth firms.  This was raised in the overview interviews as one of the 
features of small firms which made them attractive suppliers to large firms. 
The managers of the fast-growing firms all emphasised management systems and 
processes consistent with the findings of Hughes (1998) and Birley (1995), while 
manager 5 reported this as a weakness.  Although company 4 had invested in 
management systems for ISO9000 accreditation, this did not appear to be at the heart 
of the firm’s operations.  Only managers 4 and 6 regarded their firms as product 
innovators, though company 5 was also based on the development of unique software 
products.  All the fast growing firms were, however, process innovators, a finding 
consistent with those of Cosh and Wood (1998). 
The managers of the three fastest growing firms all identified the quality of their staff 
as a significant contributor to their competitive edge and invested in training and 
development.  The emphasis on excellence among these firms was again consistent 
with Hughes (1998).  Company 3 was alone among the fast growing firms in failing 
to emphasise the development of staff and Figure 6 shows its rate of growth levelling 
off in 1998/99.  Whilst one year’s sales results cannot be taken in isolation, this may 
indicate that the firm needs to concentrate more on development of its capabilities. 
Well-developed planning processes were also a feature of the three fastest growing 
firms, the managers of which recognised the need for clear objectives and plans to 
achieve them.  This concurs with the views emanating from the overview interviews, 
and with work by Lumme et al (1993) and Birley (1995).  The managers of fast-
growing firms were also more likely to report rapid growth strategies.  Keeble (1998) 
also identified this relationship, but he infers that the causal link is from recent past 
growth to reported strategy rather than vice versa, a view supported by Hughes 
(1998) who found no significant difference between the growth objectives of 
sustained and stalled growers in his vertical study.  Despite this, among the selected 
firms clear differences were evident between the slow-growing companies 4 and 5, 
                                                
13
 The importance of reputation in sustaining growth was also reported by Hughes (1998) 
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and the fast growing companies 1, 2, 3 and 6.  Among this latter group, the manager 
of company 3 reported a strategy of steady rather than rapid growth, and although its 
growth rate has been relatively high over recent years it is not on the type of 
trajectory exhibited by companies 1 and 2 (and to some extent by company 614).  All 
of the surveys are based on reported strategies, which, as pointed out by manager 5, 
is not necessarily the same as actual strategy.  In addition, it is one thing for a firm to 
state a growth strategy, but without a credible plan for achieving it, its delivery is 
quite another thing.  The firms which exhibited the highest rates of growth 
(companies 1, 2 and 6) all had clear objectives and systems in place to manage 
towards those objectives.  Management intent may, then, influence firm growth, but 
the expression of this intent requires much more than a simple statement on growth 
strategy. 
The managers of all but the two largest firms identified specialised expertise or 
services as significant attributes, an item reported by Hughes (1998) as common to 
stalled and sustained growers.  Although managers 1 and 2 did not specifically 
mention this item, a review of their companies’ literature makes it clear that they do 
emphasise specialised skills, particularly in the case of company 2.  Most managers 
perceived flexibility or responsiveness to customers as important, consistent with 
Hughes’ findings. 
International business was a significant feature of all firms other than companies 3 
and 4.  Lumme et al (1993) and Hughes (1998) both reported international business 
as being associated with successful firms.  In practice, only companies 1 and 6 had 
international growth strategies, since company 2 served almost entirely UK 
customers abroad, and company 5 served a very small and specialised client group in 
Europe.  Part of the rationale for company 1’s entry into the US market was said to 
be to ensure exposure to the latest technological developments ahead of their 
introduction to the UK. 
Marketing and promotional skills were claimed only by the managers of companies 5 
and 6.  The overview interviewees identified this as a weakness of British firms 
generally, so the finding is not unexpected. 
6.2 Constraints 
The most commonly identified constraint among the interviewees was the shortage 
of good quality labour which was raised by all but manager 5 (which had not sought 
to recruit significant numbers of skilled staff).  This is, of course, regarded as the 
most serious problem facing technology based companies  (Moore and Segaghat, 
1992; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1998), and is reported to be particularly severe in 
Information Technology (IT) sectors (e.g. Keeble, 1998).  All the managers 
emphasised the quality of staff, suggesting that many of those seeking employment 
in the industry were not of the requisite standard.  This was also raised as an issue in 
the overview interviews.  Manager 4 reported the additional problem of retaining 
staff, an issue common to many small firms which are unable to offer the range of 
development opportunities available with larger firms.  But the shortage of good 
quality staff is reported to have spread the retention problem to larger firms 
according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1998).  
                                                
14
 Company 6 reported having instigated a formal planning system, at the behest of non-executive 
directors, at about the same time as it commenced its recent increased rate of growth. 
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Lack of credibility with customers was the second most common constraint, 
recognised by 4 managers.  Company 5’s problems appeared to be largely due to 
poor delivery in recent years as this had not been a problem earlier.  The other three 
(managers 1, 2 and 6), all reported the typical problems of small firms trying to be 
taken seriously by large customers.  Manager 6 saw this mainly as a problem of 
accessing key decision makers.  The problem of credibility is not raised in the 
literature, but was identified in the overview interviews.  Most of the companies (the 
three fastest growing) appeared to have overcome the problem but it was recognised 
as a challenge. 
Poor management effectiveness is widely recognised as a problem for growing firms 
(e.g. Barber et al, 1989; Storey, 1994; Birley, 1995) and was identified by the 
managers of the two smallest firms, though a much greater problem for company 5 
(with respect to its founder), than for company 415.  The overview interviews 
identified this as a significant problem, but it is not surprising that firms did not 
report it more widely, given the natural reluctance to self-criticise.  
Similarly, only manager 3 identified marketing and sales effectiveness as a 
constraint, despite this being identified as a significant issue by a number of 
researchers (Lumme et al., 1993; Keeble, 1998; Hughes 1998), and by the overview 
interviewees.  Again their may be a reluctance among interviewees to be self critical. 
Decisions made early in the firm’s life were not recognised as leading to constraints 
for firms other than 1 and 6.  Manager 6 identified a problem of split-site 
accommodation, but it is difficult to see how the firm could have committed to the 
accommodation to which it was about to relocate earlier in its existence.  For 
company 1, the decision to focus on services rather than software packages was 
perceived as a genuine constraint, reflecting the views of some of the overview 
interviewees.  Starting the firm with services could, however, be a sound strategy for 
organic growth as services firms generate revenues much earlier in their lives than 
software package firms, and permit a greater degree of flexibility. 
A number of constraints reported in the literature were not reported by the managers 
interviewed.  These include increasing competition and overall growth of market 
demand (Keeble, 1998; Hughes, 1998); cost and availability of finance (Moore, 
1994); acquisition and implementation of technology (Keeble, 1998; Hughes, 1998); 
government/macro-economic issues (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1998). 
It is, of course, possible that the managers, particularly 1, 2, 3 and 6, had derived 
strategies to overcome growth limiting market factors.  There is certainly evidence to 
suggest that firms have generally been adept at evolving their strategy to take 
account of new technologies and customer demands.  Company 4’s strategy was not 
based on significant growth and it may not therefore have encountered market 
constraints within its limited niche.  The interviewee for company 5 similarly 
reported that the underlying strategy of the firm was to maintain a steady state.  On 
the other hand it is also possible that the fast-growing interviewed firms had failed to 
recognise external factors while they were able to maintain very high rates of growth 
into an expanding sub-sector of the market.16 
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 It should be noted that the interviewee for company 5 had recently left the firm and was perhaps 
therefore more willing, and perhaps more able, to adopt a critical stance. 
16
 Companies 1, 2 and 6 were all expanding into e-commerce. 
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The acquisition of technology was not deemed a problem by any of the managers.  
For company 5, this appeared to be due to its tendency to develop everything in-
house.  The other firms had taken advantage of the providers’ partnering networks to 
access technology, and saw its implementation as their prime function. 
Only manager 1 mentioned government intervention, and this was with respect to 
new regulations covering the employment of contract staff, and then only in passing.  
It is therefore assumed that this issue is not significant for the firms interviewed.  
This may indicate that government legislation acts as a constraint for a limited 
number of firms in particular niches within the market, though for the firms affected 
it would be significant. 
Problems with the cost and availability of finance appear regularly in surveys and 
studies of firm development and growth (e.g. Barber et al., 1989, Storey, 1994, Cosh 
and Hughes, 1998) and were recognised by most of the overview interviewees.  The 
managers also recognised the difficulties of obtaining venture capital funding in the 
UK, as compared with the USA.  Manager 6 also reported the fact that investors were 
now approaching the firm, as its success became apparent, having been absent 
previously.  Company 2 had obtained funding from the stock market via an IPO 
seemingly without great difficulty.  None saw funding as a constraint.  It should be 
noted, however, that all but one of the firms was focussed on the provision of 
computing services rather than software packages.  It is well recognised that the 
funding requirements of services companies are much less severe that those of 
manufacturing or production enterprises both at start-up and during growth.  The 
single software package provider had not grown significantly for many years, 
apparently at least partly due to its founders preferred strategy, and was therefore 
unlikely to require high levels of capital investment.  A protracted development 
period and a lack of sales had created something of a cash crisis, but this appeared to 
have had less to do with the external market for financial resources than its internal 
problems. 
Overall, then, the findings were generally consistent with the literature, or could be 
explained by the particular features of the industry.  The main exception was finance. 
 
7 EXPLAINING FIRM GROWTH 
Whilst the findings of the present study can largely be understood in the context of 
the industry, and the findings of previous work, no distinctive patterns of attributes 
and constraints emerge from the empirical evidence.  Consideration of attributes and 
constraints alone does not explain the differential performance exhibited by the firms 
investigated in the study.  In order to come closer to such an explanation, the 
evidence can usefully be explored from a number of theoretical perspectives, and the 
following discussion will review the findings with respect to the themes outlined in 
Section 2. 
7.1 Market based approaches 
The constraints metaphor itself is in the tradition of conventional economic theories 
of the firm, and strategic models derived from them such as the work of Michael 
Porter (e.g. Porter, 1980, 1998).  Many constraints are outside the firm acting on it, 
and this principle persists to some extent in the model proposed by Hughes (1998).  
These types of approach have proved useful in the analysis of the problems facing 
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mature firms, but it is less clear how far they can be applied to growing or 
“emerging” firms. 
Given that firms are seen to be responding to forces in the external market, and 
manoeuvring themselves to gain advantage over competitors, market, or external 
factors ought to predominate in the mind of the entrepreneur.  The firms studied here 
actually do identify an “external” factor, the availability of suitable labour, as their 
most common constraint.  Keeble (1998) reports that in his study five of the top six 
constraints were external.  Lack of credibility with customers might also be regarded 
as an external constraint, but the firms had largely overcome it. 
Other key external factors such as the availability of financial resources, market 
demand and increased competition were not perceived as constraints on the 
interviewed firms.  It could be argued that the firms had not yet reached a stage of 
development at which these factors were effective.  For instance, the fast growing 
firms were relatively young and expanding into a growing market.  Given a total 
market value in excess of £16bn, the turnover of even the largest firms represents a 
tiny fraction (0.1%), although this should ideally be related to the firms’ target 
sectors rather than the market as a whole.  Further evidence of the impact of market 
conditions is provided by the rapid growth rates achieved by companies 1, 3 and 6 
from around 1995 following years of relatively slow growth which more or less 
coincided with stalled growth in the market (Figure 6). 
However, from a market based perspective, firms of a similar size and at similar 
stages of development would be expected to perceive similar constraints to their 
growth, something which is not a feature of the study group.  Hughes (1998) 
acknowledges this fact in his reference to resource-based theories of the firm, and 
incorporates firm capabilities and resources into his model. 
7.2 Developmental approaches 
All of the managers recognised significant changes in the demands placed on 
managers as the firm grows.  Companies 1, 2 and 6 were led by people with strong 
management skills, but all had seen or expected to see changes in the senior 
management team as those who preferred the role of a small business manager left 
the organisation or withdrew from the senior management role.  The effects of the 
founder not allowing the management system to develop were seen in company 5, 
where the firm’s growth was crippled by the kind of problems identified by Birley 
(1995).  In the case of company 4 the founders recognised that the necessary 
development could only take place within a larger organisation and had sought out an 
acquirer. 
The model proposed by Garnsey (1998), describes the stages of growth experienced 
by young firms.  Two stages are of particular interest here: growth reinforcement and 
growth generation. 
The growth reinforcement stage is said to apply where “unusual” firms succeed in 
mobilising rapidly and generating revenue early, often aided by growth markets.  A 
number of mechanisms operate to reinforce growth including the economies of 
growth identified by Penrose (1995), and external pressures from investors and 
partners or customers.  The rapid growth brings with it the need to for managers to 
delegate, synchronisation of the firm, and the need to manage external relationships. 
The computer software and services industry operates in a fast growing market.  But 
it is also unusual in that revenues can be generated very early in the firm’s life, and 
production/service provision can be scaled up with relative ease when compared with 
other high-technology sectors, even for software package producers.  There is no 
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requirement to construct an infrastructure to support the product, and the equipment 
required is generic and of relatively low cost.  Manufacturing, where it applies, is 
usually undertaken by third parties, either as distributors or sub-contractors.  
Conditions are therefore ideal for rapid growth and reinforcement. 
The emphasis on the demands placed on managers to succeed in conditions of 
growth reinforcement is consistent with the evidence of the firms interviewed.  The 
fast-growing firms (companies 1, 2, 3 and 6) all rely heavily on partnerships and 
have management systems in place to deal with the co-ordination of the firm’s 
resources.  Company 3, which does not appear to emphasise management systems to 
the same extent shows signs of levelling off in its growth trajectory, presumably as 
the co-ordination and management problems increase. 
The Garnsey (op. cit.) model also points out that growth paths vary considerably, 
with some firms operating on a growth plateau for a time, before resuming growth 
when the constraints on them have been addressed.  Companies 1 and 6 certainly 
exhibit this type of development, having been in existence for some years before they 
achieved high rates of growth. 
The growth path of company 5 exhibits growth reversal (Figure 11), following 
growth of 13% in the year ending 1997.  According to the interviewee the additional 
sales were perceived by the founder and management team as the beginning of a 
recovery and efforts to obtain venture capital were curtailed. 
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Figure 11 – Company 5 Annual sales 
Developmental approaches draw attention to the impact of early decisions on a 
firm’s later growth (Garnsey, 1998).  For example, lock-in, whereby commitment to 
a particular sector or activity closes out alternatives, and the initiation of networks of 
relationships and partnerships, are both features of the early stages of firm 
development which can serve to constrain or promote growth.  Such effects can be 
very enduring, having been identified even in long established firms such as the 100 
year old grocery firms studies by Harris and Ogbonna (1999). 
The firm-related managers did not report this as a significant issue.  Manager 1 
recognised that the choice of services rather than software could act as a constraint to 
future growth, but the firm was taking steps to deal with it.  However, if the firms 
had chosen a different technology-based sector, such as biotechnology with its long 
development cycles and potentially higher risk of failure, they might now report that 
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choice as a reason for their lack of revenue and commitment to high levels of 
investment.  In fact, both software and services sub-sectors are fast growing, require 
little initial investment, and generate revenues relatively quickly17.  The choice of 
sector, could, therefore, be said to be a key factor in their successful growth. 
Even at the industry level, firms selecting “good” niches (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
1998), and managing well within them, did not encounter the problems faced by, say, 
company 5.  In particular, the choice of the services sub-sector reduced financial 
demands in the early stages of growth and avoided the need to develop a product 
before generating revenues.  In fact, as mentioned earlier, product development 
problems with the windows version of its software was a fact contributing to the poor 
performance of company 5. 
The importance of relationships, particularly in gaining access to technology, was 
recognised by most managers, mainly through their involvement in technology 
supplier partner programmes, something which company 5 had, reportedly, generally 
ignored. 
This, then, presents a pro-active view of developmental approaches, emphasising the 
need to lay the foundations of sustained growth early in the life of the firm, and the 
need to recognise the future impact of decisions.  Hughes (1998) examined 
differences in prospective and retrospective constraints reported by firms, finding 
that sustained growers were affected less by anticipated constraints and more by 
unexpected constraints.  This suggests that the recognition of potential constraints 
ahead can actually reduce their impact.  Perhaps, due to the development of 
appropriate capabilities, well managed firms do not experience potentially growth-
limiting factors as constraints. 
7.3 Resource-based theories 
Teece suggests that the key to success is the development of a range of capabilities 
which allow the firm to exploit opportunities and deal with challenges, and there is 
evidence of interviewed firms doing this, particularly companies 1, 2 and 6 (those 
with the highest rate of growth).  Manager 4 on the other hand saw competencies 
residing in individuals and did not recognise significant additional capabilities at the 
firm level.  The manager of company 3, whose growth trajectory may have been 
levelling off, appeared to recognise the value added by the firm, but its failure to 
emphasise the integration of its staff (who were mainly contractors) probably limited 
its ability to develop firm competencies to the full. 
The emphasis on management and marketing skills that was prevalent in the 
overview interviews also appears to reflect the need to focus on the firm’s portfolio 
of skills and competencies. 
The dynamic capabilities approach, then, fits well with the research findings and 
provides a positive perspective of firms as active agents preparing themselves for the 
challenges of the future.  In this context many “constraints” could therefore be said to 
reflect the firms’ weaknesses rather than external factors. 
                                                
17
 Some parts of the industry, such as Internet Service Providers (IPOs) may require significant 
funding for promotion to achieve significant growth, but none of the firms interviewed were in this 
sub-sector.  The fact simply emphasises the significance of sector/sub-sector selection. 
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7.4 Further considerations 
The failure to identify finance as a problem is more difficult to explain, but Penrose’s 
description of the environment “...as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the 
possibilities and restrictions with which he is confronted” (1995, p.5) draws attention 
to an alternative perspective. 
Almost all of the firms recognised the difficulties involved in obtaining external 
funding, as did the overview interviewees.  Work by Latter and Garnsey (1995) has 
expanded on some of the reasons for this, focussing on the asymmetries which exist 
between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.  Risk aversion among investors is also 
a much-quoted factor. 
It could be that the firms have deliberately adopted an organic growth path in order 
to avoid problems of obtaining external funding.  This would be consistent with the 
findings of Hughes (1998) with respect to prospective evaluation of constraints.  
Having adopted an organic growth strategy, the firm’s growth rate will depend upon 
its ability to generate revenues (as pointed out by manager 6).  Objectives will have 
been set taking into account this factor, hence eliminating it as a “constraint”.  
Company 2, with the most impressive growth path of all the firms (sales rising from 
0 to £20m in 5 years) obtained external finance through an IPO in order to maintain 
its trajectory.  Company 6, on the other hand, was reported to have been relatively 
ignorant of the US venture capital environment until it opened a US office. 
Similarly, a firm’s marketing performance will be taken into account when 
estimating future revenues, hence eliminating this factor as a “constraint”, although 
manager 1 recognised that this could emerge as an issue as it grew beyond sales of 
£20m per annum. 
The subjective nature of constraints and their impact on firm growth is further 
reinforced by consideration of the situation in the USA.  Although the environment is 
generally regarded as more amenable to the development of technology-based firms, 
particularly with respect to venture capital, the problems reported by growing firms 
are remarkably similar.  A study by Terpstra and Olson (1993) found a pattern of 
problems which emphasised management and other internal issues over the market 
and financial constraints, particularly among firms which had developed beyond the 
early stages of growth. 
Despite this, US firms do appear to grow faster and larger than UK firms, with one of 
the key differences cited as a lack of managers capable of taking firms beyond the 
small scale (e.g. Jones, 1998), though the availability of finance cannot be ignored.  
The example of growth in the UK versus adequately funded growth in the USA 
quoted by one of the overview interviewees, gives further weight to this argument. 
A self-limiting mechanism may operate even among some relatively successful UK 
firms in fast-growing industries, whereby the threshold of success is lowered to take 
into account structural problems in the UK market, and an inadequate skills base.   
Summarising this, then, it might be said that: 
1. The relevant operating environment is that which is perceived by the 
entrepreneur18. 
 
                                                
18
 The term “entrepreneur” is employed here to represent the person or persons responsible for the 
firm’s strategy and its implementation. 
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Hence, the entrepreneur will only respond to a sub-set of the opportunities 
and constraints (possibilities and restrictions in Penrose’s terms) actually 
present. 
2. The entrepreneur will take into account environmental factors and his firm’s 
capabilities when defining objectives. 
 
The entrepreneur may identify development requirements, but she is likely to 
regard “external” or structural factors as given, and may not be prepared to 
commit to objectives which require substantial additional capabilities.  There 
is therefore a self-limiting process. 
3. The effective entrepreneur will act to deal with the constraints he perceives, 
either by the development of new or improved capabilities, or strategic 
manoeuvring. 
 
Hence, where constraints are recognised in advance their impact will be 
reduced either by avoidance or positive action. 
The simple model depicted in Figure 12 illustrates these points. 
Structural FactorsEntrepreneur's
 Growth Objectives
Entrepreneur's
 Perceptions of Constraints
Actions to Overcome  
Constraints
Other Factors
Entrepreneur's
Perceptions of Opportunities
 
Figure 12 A model of constraints on growth 
A parallel can be drawn between the opportunities and constraints identified in the 
model and the “possibilities and restrictions” referred to by Penrose (1995).  
“Structural factors” include such things as the availability of investment capital and, 
to some extent, the availability of human resources of the requisite quality.  “Other 
factors” includes the education, capabilities, experience and motivation of the 
entrepreneur and her staff, the organisational competencies of the firm, and chance. 
The entrepreneur’s perceptions of opportunities will be based on his understanding of 
the environment, which in turn will depend upon the information available to him, 
the “other factors” referred to above (e.g. known competencies) and his 
understanding of relevant structural factors (Item 2). 
The opportunities will form the basis of the growth objectives which will also be 
influenced by factors such as motivation and capabilities.  Constraints will emerge 
from the perceived interaction of the structural and “other factors” and the growth 
objectives.  In other words, factors will only constrain growth if they interfere with 
the objectives adopted by the entrepreneur. 
Where constraints do emerge, action is initiated to address them, either by avoidance 
or by procuring the necessary resources or capabilities (Item 3).  This process could 
operate as a feedback loop, with the entrepreneur re-assessing objectives, recognising 
new opportunities, or perceiving different constraints (either due to knowledge 
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gained from the first cycle, or through changes brought about by positive action).  
The feedback process has been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
7.5 Exploring the model 
In an ideal world with perfect information and with resources freely available in the 
market, the entrepreneur would address all restraining factors in an optimal manner, 
changing course to avoid those for which the cost of removal is greater than the 
benefits, and procuring the necessary capabilities to deal with those where it is not.  
It is important to recognise that neither avoidance nor the development of new 
capabilities is necessarily right or wrong, the appropriate response will depend upon 
the specific conditions of a given case. 
The world is not perfect, nor is the entrepreneur.  Item 1 states that the relevant 
environment is that perceived by the entrepreneur.  Accordingly, if the entrepreneur’s 
perception of opportunities and constraints is imperfect, the growth objectives will be 
less than optimal, as will be the actions implemented to deal with constraints. 
The failure of the managers interviewed to report a wider range of constraints 
appears to result from three main sources.  First, the firms may have recognised the 
potentially constraining factors and implemented actions to overcome them, there is 
some evidence of this in most of the companies (e.g. use of partnerships to ensure 
access to technology).  Second, the entrepreneurs’ perceptions of constraints or 
opportunities may be too limited.  Finally, there may actually be no problem. 
It is now possible to return to the question of the failure to identify finance as a 
constraint.  The model proposes that the structural factor not only influences the 
perception of the constraint, but also affects the setting of objectives via the 
entrepreneur’s perception of opportunities.  Hence, the entrepreneur may have set a 
sub-optimal target having taken into account the unavailability of external finance.  It 
may also be the case that finance may not be a constraint on firm growth, though this 
seems unlikely given the views of the experienced directors interviewed in the 
overview, and the fact that firm 2 has seen the need to seek external finance through 
an IPO to maintain its growth trajectory. 
If entrepreneurial teams have already factored in environmental constraints and been 
influenced by these perceived “realities” in setting goals for the firm, they will not 
necessarily perceive or present them as constraints.  Given more ambitious 
objectives, perhaps more firms would report a greater range of constraining factors, 
but would also appreciate more fully their own potential. 
If this is to be achieved there are two main implications for both entrepreneurs and 
policy makers: 
The expectations of entrepreneurs need to be surfaced and discussed, to ensure that 
they are aware of the range of opportunities available to them. 
Education and training of entrepreneurs may have a part to play in this.  A study by 
Stanworth and Gray in 1992 reported a very low level of management training 
among the managers of small firms, and a distinct reluctance to take advantage of 
that which was offered to them (usually because they were “too busy”).  They also 
found evidence linking the low level of training with business problems.  The low 
level of prior management experience among the interviewed firms and the high 
incidence of “management effectiveness” cited as a constraint in the overview 
interviews suggest that the situation had not improved significantly since 1992. 
There needs to be a better understanding of what is actually being taken into account 
in the formulation of business objectives and strategies in order that the real nature 
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and impact of constraining factors can be established.  If a factor is not widely 
reported as a constraint this cannot be taken to signify that it is not affecting 
performance.  Managers and entrepreneurs need to be made more aware of their 
implicit assumptions and how they might be influencing their decision-making.  
Failure to address these “hidden” constraints could continue to prevent small firms in 
the UK from growing to their full potential and so generating the value of which they 
are capable. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
A wide range of constraints was reported by the firms considered here.  No 
distinctive patterns emerged strongly linking particular constraints to poor growth 
performance or specific firm attributes. 
The most widely reported problem facing firms in this sector appears to be a shortage 
of good quality, skilled staff.  After this, most factors relate to the management of 
firms, with some evidence from the interviews of the impact of good management 
systems and practices.  The importance of flexibility and the building of 
organisational capabilities was evident, as was the importance of reputation among 
firms of all sizes. 
The availability of investment funding was widely recognised as an issue, though it 
was not rated overall as a significant constraint.  However, this may be due to many 
firms having adopted strategies based on self-funded organic growth.  This and other 
findings suggest that structural defects and other industry factors could be 
constraining growth even among successful firms, through the setting of sub-optimal 
objectives based on strategies which make it unnecessary for firms to address 
potential constraining factors. 
The neglect of subjective factors shaping the perception of constraints that affect 
small firm growth points to a weakness in the analysis of firm strategy and 
performance based on self-reported factors.  Entrepreneurs, and others involved with 
the management of the firm, rely on their own interpretation and understanding of 
the enterprise and its environment.  Both constraints and attributes are to some extent 
subjective, and the awareness, and therefore reporting, of them depends upon the 
individual’s own knowledge and understanding.  The fact that a particular factor is 
not identified as either a constraint or an attribute does not mean that it has not 
affected the firm’s performance.  Indeed, the most problematic constraints may be 
those of which the entrepreneur is unaware. 
The answer to the problem highlighted by David Storey (1994)19 may lie as much in 
improving managers’ awareness and understanding of the factors affecting growth as 
in action to remove structural defects in the economy. 
                                                
19
 “It is the failure of UK small enterprises to grow into large enterprises that may be at the heart of 
the country’s long-term poor economic performance” (Storey, 1994, p.159) 
 37 
9 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barber, J, Metcalfe, JS and Porteus, M, 1989, Barriers to Growth in Small Firms, 
Routledge, London 
Barney, J, 1991, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage”, Journal 
of Management 17 (1991):99-120 
Barrett, WP, 1997, “The Perils of Success”, Forbes, New York, Nov 3, 1997 
Best, M and Garnsey, E, 1999, “Edith Penrose, 1914-1996”, The Economic 
Journal, 109 (February), F187-F201, Blackwell, Oxford 
Bhidé, A, 1999, “Building the Self-Sustaining Firm”, in Sahlman et al, 1999 
Birley, S, 1995, “Why enterprise matters”, FT Mastering Management web-site, 
www.ftmastering.com. 
Birley, S, 1996, “What’s your downfall?”, Director, London, Dec 1996. 
Chandler, A, 1961, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial 
Enterprise, Doubleday & co., New York 
Churchill, N and Lewis, V, 1983, “The Five Stages of Small Business Growth”, 
Harvard Business Review, Boston, May/June, 1983. 
Cosh, A and Hughes, A (eds.), 1998, Enterprise Britain: Growth, Innovation and 
Public Policy in the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Sector 1994-1997, ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge. 
Cosh, A, Hughes, A and Wood, E, 1996, “Innovation in UK SMEs: Causes and the 
Consequences for Firm Failure and Acquisition”, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 48. 
Cosh, A and Wood, E, 1998, “Innovation: Scale, Objectives and Constraints”, in 
Cosh, A. and Hughes, A., 1998, “Enterprise Britain”, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge. 
De Witt, B and Meyer, R (eds.), 1998, Strategy: Process, Content, Context – An 
International Perspective, Thomson Business Press, London 
Drucker, PF, 1996, “Innovation imperative”, Executive Excellence, Provo, Dec 
1996 
Dodge, HR and Robbins, J, 1992, “An empirical investigation of the organisational 
life cycle model for small business development and survival”, Journal of Small 
Business Management, Milwaukee, Jan 1992 
Evans, DS, 1987, “Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 1987, vol. 95, no. 4. 
Fleck, V and Garnsey, E, 1988, “Managing Growth at Acorn Computers”, Journal 
of General Management, Vol. 13, No. 3, Spring 1998 
Garnsey, E, 1998, “A Theory of the Early Growth of the Firm”, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1998 
Garnsey, E, Stam, E, Heffernan, P, 2006, “New Firm Growth: Exploring Processes 
and Paths”, Industry and Innovation, Vol. 13, No 1, pp1-20, March 2006   
Grant, R, 1998, Contemporary Strategy Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, 
Applications, Blackwell, Malden MA 
 38 
Harris, LC and Ogbonna, E, 1999, “The strategic legacy of company founders”, 
Long Range Planning, London, Vol. 32, No. 3 
Holway, 1999, The Holway Report, Richard Holway Limited, London  
Hughes, A, 1998, “Growth Constraints on Small and Medium-Sized Firms”, ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 107 
Hughes, A and Storey, DJ (eds.), 1994, Finance and the Small Firm, Routledge, 
London 
Jones, K, 1998, “US Report: Old Cambridge targets high-tech success” ZD Net UK, 
Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 
Keeble, D, 1998, “Growth Objectives and Constraints”, in Cosh, A. and Hughes, A., 
1998, “Enterprise Britain”, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge 
Latter, D and Garnsey, E, 1995, “Venture capital and high technology enterprise”, 
Cambridge Research Papers in Management Studies No. 24, Judge Institute of 
Management Studies, Cambridge 
Lumme, A, Kauranen, I, Autio, E and Kaila, MM, 1993, “New Technology-
Based Companies in Cambridge In an International Perspective”, ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 35. 
Mahoney, J and Pandian, J, 1992, “The Resource-Based View Within the 
Conversation of Strategic Management”, Strategic Management Journal 13 (1992): 
363-380. 
Minshall, T and Garnsey, E, 1999, “Building production competence and 
enhancing organisational capabilities through acquisition: The case of Mitsubishi 
Electric”, International Journal of Technology Management, Geneva, Vol. 17, No. 3. 
Moore, B and Segaghat, N, 1992, “Factors constraining the growth of small high-
technology companies: A case study of the Cambridge sub-region”, ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 20. 
Moore, B, 1994, “Financial constraints to the growth and development of small 
high-technology firms” in “Finance and the Small Firm”, Hughes, A. and Storey, DJ, 
(eds.), Routledge, London. 
Moore, B, 1994a, “Financial Constraints to the Growth and Development of Small 
High-Technology Firms”, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 31. 
Penrose, E, 1995, The theory of the growth of the firm, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (First published 1959 – 2nd edition 1995 with revised forward by the author). 
Porter, ME, 1980, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Competitors, Free Press, New York 
Porter, ME, 1998, “Competitive Strategy” in De Witt, B and R Meyer (eds.), 1998  
This article is based on Porter, 1985, Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance, New York Free Press 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1998, A passport to prosperity?  Results of a 
benchmarking study for UK technology companies (10 to 100 employees), 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, London 
Reid, S and Garnsey, E, 1996, “High Technology – High Risk?: The Myth of the 
Fragile Firm”, University of Cambridge, Research Papers in Management Studies 
No. 10. 
 39 
Reid, S and Garnsey, E, 1997, “The growth of small high-tech firms: Destinies and 
destinations of Innovation Centre ‘graduates’”, New Technology, Work, and 
Employment, Oxford, Sep 1997. 
Roberts, MJ, 1999, “The Challenge of Growth”, in Sahlman et al (eds.), 1999 
Sahlman, WA, Stevenson, HH, Roberts, MJ and Bhidé, A, 1999, “The 
Entrepreneurial Venture”, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass 
Senge, P, 1990, “The fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning 
Organisation”, Century 
Shah GJ, and Garnsey, E, 1994, “The acquisition of high technology firms: 
Evidence form Cambridge”, University of Cambridge, Research Papers in 
Management Studies 1993-1994 No. 7. 
Smith, G and Fleck, V, 1987, “Business Strategies in Small High-Technology 
Companies”, Long Range Planning, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp 61 to 68, 1987 
Stanworth, J and Gray, C, 1992, “Entrepreneurship and education: Action-based 
research”, International Small Business Journal, London, Jan-Mar 1992 
Storey, DJ, 1994, Understanding the Small Business Sector, Routledge, London and 
New York 
Teece D and Pisano, G, 1994, “The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: and 
Introduction”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 3, No.3, 1994 
Teece D, Pisano G and Shuen, A, 1997, “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18:7, 509-533 (1997) 
Terpstra, D and Olson, P, 1993, “Entrepreneurial start-up and growth: A 
classification of problems”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 17, 3, 
Spring 1993 
Westhead, P and Storey, DJ, 1997, “Financial Constraints on the growth of high 
technology small firms in the United Kingdom”, Applied Financial Economics, 
London, Apr 1997 
 
 Appendix 1 Interview Framework 
 Constraints on the Growth of Computer Software and Services Firms 
Interview Framework – Company-based Interviews 
 
Company Details 
Employees, Sales and Profit for the last 5 years 
Start up details and type of firm: Start Date; Sector (Software/services); Origin (MBO, MBI, Spin-
out, New Start-up) 
Founders (Individual, New Team, Existing team, Other);  
Capital Structure and sources of funding and (Founders, Business Angel, Venture Capital, Debt) 
 
Management Team 
Who holds the key management positions?  (Founders; external recruits; promoted staff) 
What was the management team’s experience prior to joining this firm? 
• In the industry/sector 
• In management   
How have the management structure and procedures of the company changed over time?  How have 
the roles of the founders/senior managers changed? 
To what extent have external advisors assisted the company’s development? 
 
Strategy 
What is the company’s strategy and objectives, particularly in terms of turnover and growth? 
To what extent has the strategy changed since start-up?  Have changes been associated with crises, 
decision points or deliberate changes in direction?  How realistic or challenging were the original 
objectives?  To what extent have early decisions affected firm strategy in the long run?  Is there a 
clear exit strategy? 
What is the company’s customer base? 
What is the nature and scale of the firm’s international business? 
 
Competitive Advantages 
What are the firm’s main competitive advantages?  [Ask open question first, then prompt to check 
relevance of items identified elsewhere:] 
Firm Attributes: Marketing/promotional skills; Speed of service; Established reputation; Cost advantages; 
Flair and creativity; Personal attention/responsiveness to customers; 
Deliverable: Price; Product or service design; Product or service innovation; Product or service quality; 
Specialised expertise/product/services; Range of expertise/product/services 
What (if any) company-specific skills/problem solving strategies have evolved over time? 
 
Constraints 
What are the constraints on your firm’s growth?  [Ask open question first, then prompt to check 
relevance of items identified elsewhere:] 
Resources: Availability and cost of finance for expansion; Shortage of skilled labour; Shortage of 
experienced management staff; Management effectiveness; Marketing and sales effectiveness 
Technology: Difficulties in acquisition of technology; Difficulties in implementing new technology 
Support: Availability of premises or site; Availability of knowledgeable professional advisors 
Market: Access to customers; Access to overseas markets; Overall growth of market demand; Increasing 
competition; Strength of large competitors; Lack of credibility with customers 
History: Strategic decisions made early in the firm’s life 
 
